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Tweeting to democracy: A new anti-authoritarian liberation struggle in 
Zimbabwe 
What does it take for a citizen movement to topple a deep-rooted authoritarian regime? 
This paper analyses the successes and failures of citizen-led social media campaigns in 
Zimbabwe. Using data drawn from an extensive ethnographic study of 50 WhatsApp and 
Facebook communities, this paper studies the conditions under which citizen activism, 
particularly those movements that originate on social media, become street protests that 
can effectively unseat an illegitimate regime. I find that the success of recent movements – 
evidenced by policy changes and increased citizen participation – is in part because of the 
rise of a youth citizenry that does not feel indebted to the liberation struggle. Zimbabwean 
born frees are more willing to take political risks by speaking candidly about politics on-
line and mobilizing their peers. 
Keywords: social media, citizen protests, engagement, online politics, 
Zimbabwe, authoritarian regime
Tweetar para a democracia: Uma nova luta de libertação antiautoritária no 
Zimbábue
O que é preciso para um movimento cidadão derrubar um regime autoritário pro-
fundamente enraizado? Este artigo analisa os sucessos e fracassos das campanhas nas 
redes sociais conduzidas por cidadãos no Zimbábue. Utilizando dados extraídos de um 
extenso estudo etnográfico de 50 comunidades WhatsApp e Facebook, este artigo estuda 
as condições sob as quais o ativismo cidadão, particularmente os movimentos originados 
nas redes sociais, se tornam protestos de rua que podem efetivamente destituir um regime 
ilegítimo. Considero que o sucesso de movimentos recentes – evidenciado por mudanças 
de política e aumento da participação cidadã – é devido em parte à emergência de jovens 
cidadãos que não se sentem em dívida com a luta de libertação. Os zimbabuanos nascidos 
livres estão mais dispostos a assumir riscos políticos falando abertamente sobre política 
online e mobilizando os seus pares.
Palavras-chave: redes sociais, protestos cidadãos, engajamento, política online, 
Zimbábue, regime autoritário
Recebido: 15 de setembro de 2019
Aceite: 27 de outubro de 2019
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In the last two decades, African democracies have made remarkable progress 
in expanding suffrage and opening political space. Democratic transitions and 
economic development have enabled far-reaching radio and television network 
expansion. The majority of African respondents in the 2018 Afrobarometer sur-
veys report that they receive the majority of their news via the radio. Additionally, 
the proportion of those who receive their news from the television has also dra-
matically increased from just 21% in 1999 to 38.5% who said they received news 
from TV daily. There is a general sense that increased access to digital informa-
tion technology is good for democracy in Africa and other developing regions 
(Bailard, 2012; Bailard & Livingston, 2014).
However, even as access to information has become more accessible, incum-
bent governments continue to wield power over media and use that power to 
restrict citizen access to information when it suits them. Thus, more and more cit-
izens are relying on the internet for more diverse independent news sources. The 
growth of cellphone networks and fiber optics across the continent has lowered 
the cost of receiving and sending information. In the last decade, the proportion of 
Africans in the Afrobarometer surveys who reported that they receive news from 
the internet rose from 2.6% in 2008 to 14.5% in 2014. Improved fiber optic-net-
works have also made the internet easily accessible on mobile phones. Over 70% 
of African respondents in the 2015 Afrobarometer surveys reported that they use 
their mobile every day. In 2017, Facebook reported that it had reached 170 million 
users in Africa (Shapshak, 2017). There is no publicly available official data from 
social media companies or governments in African for other social media plat-
forms. However, conservative estimates from websites that track internet usage 
such as internetworldstats.com suggest that at least 11 million African users are 
active on Twitter, LinkedIn, and WhatsApp and that more than 2.9 million vid-
eos are viewed from YouTube each month (Internet World Stats, 2017). African 
citizens are using online platforms to connect with friends and family, as well as 
to discuss politics. With the goal of contributing to the growing literature on the 
impact of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) on African poli-
tics, this paper asks the following questions: 1) how are people getting involved 
in politics through social media? 2) how are they trying to push democracy? And 
3) what have been the responses of the authoritarian government?
This paper begins with a theoretical look at the literature on digital engage-
ment and goes into a brief history of social media engagement in various African 
contexts. The paper then goes into an in-depth discussion of the methodology 
used for this study and a discussion of the findings. 
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Theorizing the digital citizen 
Since the success of the Arab Spring revolutions in the Middle East and 
North Africa, there has been growing expectation that digital Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs), particularly social media platforms like 
Facebook, can foster political mobilization thereby contributing positively to 
democratic growth (Breuer & Groshek, 2014). Scholars in support of ICTs as a “lib-
eration technology” argue that mobile phones and internet access offer citizens 
low cost, secure, and decentralized pathways to engage with politics (Castells, 
2011; Mustvairo & Sirks, 2011). It is further argued that these technologies shield 
citizens, particularly those in authoritarian regimes, where communication is 
heavily monitored and regulated from the prying eyes of the state. Theoretically, 
we would also expect that it should be easier for politicians to reach previously 
excluded people in politics (Bode, 2012; Conroy et al., 2012; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 
2012; Vitak et al., 2011; Steenkamp and Hyde-Clarke, 2014). Lee (2012) found that 
Chinese citizens in the privacy of their homes and on their phones and comput-
ers can discuss grievances, and this engagement can translate into real political 
action by joining protests. In the Zimbabwean case, we have seen some increase 
in the degree to which citizens are engaging in politics. 
For young people with limited financial resources, social media is a low-cost 
way to engage with the political conversation. Unlike traditional text messaging 
systems that charge users per message sent in most countries, users buy monthly 
bundles for WhatsApp or Facebook that allow them unlimited usage for costs 
as low as US$1/month. In countries like Zimbabwe were citizen political engage-
ment is heavily policed by the state, engaging on social media away from the 
watchful eye of the state, allows citizens to engage with politics with a sense of 
security. WhatsApp claims that their messages are encrypted, and users also use 
false names on public platforms likes Facebook and Twitter. 
In recent years, Africans, especially in the sub-Saharan region, have embraced 
social media as a tool to engage with politics. In 2015, the #feesmustfall cam-
paign, the demand by South African University students for more affordable tui-
tion, attracted significant regional and global attention, forcing the South African 
government to freeze proposed tuition increments (AfricaIsACountry, 2015; 
Booysen, 2016). The success of #feesmustfall ignited citizen campaigns, often re-
ferred to as the hashtag movements all across the continent. In 2016 alone, there 
were at least 15 high profile social media campaigns. The campaigns ranged from 
those demanding significant changes in policy such as #feesmustfall, a campaign 
demanding that university lower fees or those seeking to redress social inequal-
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ities by calling for the removal of historical monuments such as #rhodesmustfall 
and #ghandimustfall to those with minimal asks such those demanding that the 
cost of internet bundles be reduced in Zimbabwe and South Africa #datamustfall. 
Among the high-stake campaigns was the #rhodesmustfall, which demanded 
the removal of the statue of British colonialist Cecil Rhodes at the University of 
Capetown (UCT) in South Africa (Chaudhuri, 2016). At the University of Ghana, 
a #ghandimustfall petition on charge.org calling for the removal of Mahatma 
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s statue from campus garnered nearly 2,000 sig-
natures (Aberqu, 2016). Sponsors of the petition argued that although Gandhi is 
globally renowned for his fight against racism in India, he was, in fact, very racist 
towards black Africans, and, thus, his troubled legacy in Africa was sufficient to 
remove his statue form public spaces (Taylor, 2016). Social media campaigns are 
often led by youth and those in the middle class. 
In Zimbabwe, a little-known Pastor, Evan Mawarire, shook Zimbabwean pol-
itics when his homemade video bemoaning the lost promises of the nation’s lib-
eration struggle went viral attracting nearly a million views in Zimbabwe. Pastor 
Evan Mawarire’s #thisflag campaign in an unprecedented move revived urban 
activism, which had been thwarted by citizen fatigue and state repression. For 
25 days starting on April 18, 2016, Evan Mawarire posted daily videos on var-
ious socio-economic topics. In July 2016, he joined with other activist groups, 
including the youth-led more radical #tajamuka “we are fed up” and called for 
a national shutdown. Since then, Mawarire has been arrested and accused by 
the state of being an informant. At the peak of his engagement, citizens widely 
shared and discussed the contents of his videos on social media and Facebook 
groups. Mawarire’s online videos had an impact factor well into the millions as 
people from all over the world relied on his message for their take on the ongoing 
situation in Zimbabwe. Using #AfricaDecides, Africans followed election events 
across the continent. Many Africans commented online that this was their first 
time publicly showing interest in elections other than their own. Africans and 
the world followed with interest the events in the Gambia after former President 
Jammeh lost the election and then reneged on his televised promises to step 
down. In the Zimbabwean WhatsApp groups, citizens discussed the Gambian 
election looking for similarities to their situation. As it became clear that Jammeh 
would not only leave office but the country as well, Zimbabweans discussed the 
possibility of organizing community engagement to protect elections. Using so-
cial campaigns like #ifafricawasabar started by then 21-year-old pan-Africanist 
Siyanda Mohitsiwa, Africans used humor to poke fun at their national politics 
and challenge stereotypes. 
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In April 2016, the UK-based firm Portland published an extensive report on 
”how Africa tweets” (Portland Communications, 2016). Their analyses of over 1.6 
billion geo-located tweets found that 1 in 10 of the most popular African hashtags 
in 2015 was related to political issues and politicians, compared to 2 percent of 
hashtags in the United States and the United Kingdom. In Africa, every tweet 
or Facebook post has the potential to become political. In January 2017, during 
his tenure as Vice President, Emmerson Mnangagwa received a coffee mug en-
graved “boss” as a gift. A picture of the mug was circulated on social media and 
eventually used against Mr. Mnangagwa in ZANU PF’s factional wars (News24, 
2017). The rise of online activists like Evan Mawarire brought to the forefront a 
question that has been raised since the 2012 Arab Spring. Can the internet revolu-
tionize African politics? In this paper, I argue that the internet can revolutionize 
politics but not in the way of the Arab Spring. The revolution will not be broad, 
sweeping, as we witnessed in North Africa. Instead, while the campaigns will 
be sporadic and often small in size, they will also make a substantial political 
impact. The Zimbabwean government and opponents of Evan Mawarire mocked 
#thisflag and other citizen movements, calling them “popcorn movements” 
(Frey, 2017). Their strength in changing politics will come in small bursts and 
tiny “revolutionary” acts that have already begun to open up politics. 
An analysis of the impact of social media on African politics that only focuses 
on quantifiable wins may miss the small but powerful impact of citizens rais-
ing their voices. Following the first shutdown, Zimbabwe’s First Lady addressed 
the ZANU PF women’s league. In an impassioned speech targeting Pastor Evan 
Mawarire, the former First Lady Dr. Amai Grace Mugabe decried the millions of 
dollars that her business lost over the two-day shutdown. Mawarire was arrested 
a week after the first shutdown and a day before the scheduled second shutdown. 
His arrest prompted several thousand citizens to show up at the courthouse in 
protest of what many citizens considered an unjust arrest. When I arrived at the 
courthouse at 10 am that morning there were less than 50 people, by the time he 
was released shortly after 7 pm there were an estimated 5,000 citizens peacefully 
protesting his arrest. 
Methodology: Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and WhatsApp 
as fieldwork
According to Facebook’s official statistics released in May 2017, users 
send 31.25 million messages and view at least 2.77 million videos per minute 
(Facebook, 2017). On Twitter, users send out over 300,000 tweets per minute, over 
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48,000 Instagram pictures are shared per minute, and at least 300 hours of video 
are uploaded every minute on YouTube (Lowe, 2016). These numbers change by 
the minute as new users join the social media sphere. Users can also choose to 
make private or public their posts on these platforms; this can make a systematic 
study of behavior online tricky but not impossible.
Given the difficulty of collecting data on Facebook and WhatsApp plat-
forms, which are private and encrypted, I decided to use ethnographic partici-
pant observation methods to study the breadth of political conversation among 
Zimbabweans between June 2016 and June 2017. In this particular case, the re-
searcher joined the group as a member (participant) but did not make any con-
tributions to the conversations, thus maintaining an ethnographic distance and 
allowing for participant observation. The use of digital ethnographic methods 
to study communication and citizen behavior on the internet is becoming more 
standard (Murthy, 2008; Mutsvairo & Sirks, 2015). However, scholars continue 
to debate the best strategies to use and the ethics of studying behavior on the in-
ternet (Wilson et al., 2012). On the one hand, scholars see tension by referring to 
studies that are not conducted in the physical field in which the researcher shares 
space with subjects as ethnographic. The full debate on ethnographic complex-
ity is beyond the scope of this paper, but it suffices to say that this study meets 
the basic goals of ethnography “attendance and observation” (Wittel, 2000). By 
immersing myself in Zimbabwe’s online community, this study also meets the 
standards set by Clifford Geetz for thick description, which can be achieved if 
a researcher spends extended time engaged with the community under study.
To study the impact of social media in Zimbabwean politics, the initial meth-
odology included large scale analyses of citizen political engagement on Twitter, 
Facebook, and WhatsApp. Scholars interested in explaining large scale citizen 
engagement on social tend to use a variety of software tools that harvest tweets 
from the web for analysis (Zimmer & Proferes, 2014). Quantitative analysis of 
digital media reveals larger patterns of behavior that can be generalized beyond 
one subgroup (Marwick, 2014). In the Zimbabwean context, the data collected 
using NodLex software revealed that the majority of tweets are by a few individ-
uals, many of whom are either middle class elites or members of the diaspora. 
These two groups play an important role in Zimbabwean politics, but the unrep-
resentative nature of data collected from Twitter made it impossible to conduct 
any meaningful and generalizable quantitative analysis. Another important rev-
elation was that some of the popular Tweeter users are unverifiable. This is to say 
there are no known individuals behind the Twitter account. In authoritarian re-
gimes, it is not surprising that individuals might to choose to use pseudo names 
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to protect themselves against government policing of their public thoughts. The 
presence of fake accounts complicates the ability to do meaningful ethnographic 
work. With this in mind I decided to focus this paper on data collected from 
Facebook and WhatsApp groups. 
On Facebook and WhatsApp, the majority of conversation occurs in private 
or public social network groups. Facebook groups are communities created with 
the Facebook social networking site that are based on real-life interests or groups 
that declare support/affiliation with a cause. Creators of the Facebook groups can 
choose to make group membership open meaning that anyone with a Facebook 
account can join the group or membership can be granted once approved by 
a group administrator. More and more groups now require approval to join. 
Therefore, it is impossible to use software tools to collect data. An additional dis-
advantage of using software tools to pull data is that much of the communication 
does not happen in standard English language and people tend to code switch. 
People in Facebook groups tend to find solidarity with a community that 
shares common interests and in order to fully understand the dynamic of each 
group, traditional ethnographic methods of participant observation are best. To 
that end, this researcher joined 50 of the most popular Zimbabwean Facebook 
pages, groups and WhatsApp groups. A group was deemed popular if it had 
more than 2,000 members and if in a week a single post attracted over 1,000 com-
ments and likes on any topic. One women’s group has a membership of over 
70,000 Zimbabwean women with group members somewhat evenly spread be-
tween those residing in Zimbabwe and those in the diaspora. In addition to join-
ing groups, the methodology included analysis of trends on popular pages like 
zimeye.net, a tabloid/news website with popular social media presence, Voice of 
America’s Harare Studio Seven, political party pages, and becoming friends with 
or following popular activists, politicians and social commentators like Pastor 
Evan Mawarire and iHarare, another social /local gossip and politics page.
On WhatsApp, community groups are private and there is no easy way to 
find access conversation without invitation from one of the administrators. I 
contacted active politicians and activists, academics, journalists and friends for 
permission to join their WhatsApp groups. Groups joined for this research in-
cluded those that only discuss politics, partisan groups, social activist groups, 
and family groups. In total, I actively followed political conversation in 25 online 
community groups between June 2016 and June 2017. 
To supplement observational data, I conducted 20 interviews with randomly 
selected members of WhatsApp and Facebook groups. Respondents were asked 
open-ended questions on their level of political interest and engagement, their 
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main sources of news and what if any political actions they would be willing to 
take. In 2016, group members were also asked if they had participated in specif-
ic citizen led political rallies and stayaways. Where possible, respondents were 
asked to share pictures as evidence of their participation in the different political 
activities. Citizens were more likely to stayaway than to attend a rally. However, 
more citizens attended rallies in 2016 than in the past based on self-reports and 
data from the rallies. 
Can the revolution be tweeted? To answer this question, a final part of the 
methodology was to show a connection between citizen demands via social me-
dia and government response. Government response ranges from acknowledge-
ment of a problem by a minister to a change in policy aligned with the demands 
of citizens. Laws often take a long time to become final but in the majority of 
African countries where the executive is very powerful a change in policy can 
be immediate. The government can also respond negatively by shutting down a 
campaign, ignoring demands or adding further restrictions.
Social media politics in an authoritarian regime: increased 
access to information when the media is the enemy 
African presidents are rarely seen or heard from. The image of African leaders 
is well choreographed. Under Section 33 of Zimbabwe’s Criminal Codification 
and Reform Act, a person could be jailed for up to a year or fined $100 (£64) for 
insulting the president’s office. The law states: 
Any person who makes any abusive, indecent or obscene statement about or con-
cerning the President or an acting President, whether in respect of the President 
personally or the President’s office shall be guilty of undermining the authority of 
or insulting the President and liable to a fine not exceeding level six or imprison-
ment for a period not exceeding one year or both. (Criminal Law Act, 33, (2), (b))1
Although the law was deemed unconstitutional in 2013, many Zimbabweans 
have since been arrested or forced into exile under this law for offenses that range 
from writing a song (Zimbabwe, 2013), that is deemed offensive by the state, 
journalists writing about the 92-year-old president’s fragile health (CPJ, 2017) or 
citizens distributing “subversive” material detailing cases of corruption commit-
ted by government officials (Deutsche Welle, n.d.). Many opposition politicians 
have been disappeared for offenses as small as using the president’s toilet (Smith, 
1 https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/zwe/2006/criminal_law_codification_and_reform_act_html/
criminal_law_codification_and_reform_act.pdf 
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2011). In all these cases charges were eventually dropped but trial process is used 
to install fear in other citizens. 
In Zimbabwe, as in most African governments, officials are mandated to hang 
the president’s portrait in their offices and public spaces (BBC Talking Point, 
2000). While private businesses are not required by law to do this it is common-
ly understood that not hanging the portrait can be interpreted as a sign of de-
fiance. In 2012, Oliver Mtukudzi’s lighting technicians were arrested “inciting 
political sentiment”2 after he had allegedly directed spotlights onto portraits of 
President Mugabe during the song Wasakara (you’re now wasted), the title track 
of Mtukudzi’s Bvuma/Tolerance album. The president’s spokesperson Mr. George 
Charamba in a typical state response said what the technician did was an abuse 
of the office of the president.
In Zimbabwe citizens understand that there is freedom before speech, but hu-
man rights and freedom are not guaranteed after speech. Under the 2002 Public 
Order and Security Act (POSA) public gatherings require a seven-day prior notice 
and get approval from the police, failure to get either can result in both criminal 
and civil charges against the organizers (Thornycroft, 2001). As such, citizens 
have often had to be too careful what they say about politics. When asked if they 
discuss politics with friends and family, Zimbabweans have consistently said 
that they are afraid to do so. 
Access to internet has opened political communication, the ability of citizens 
to circulate media about the president, pictures or jokes has demystified political 
leaders. From the safety of their mobile phones, Zimbabweans have been able 
to share jokes, comments and thoughts on politics without fear of retribution. 
On February 5, 2015 President Mugabe publicly fell. Pictures of the statesman 
falling garnered global attention and memes by Zimbabweans on social media 
went viral. 
Figure 1: Mugabe falling from Twitter
2  http://allafrica.com/stories/200101050240.html
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Figure 2: Mugabe falling from WhatsApp
Zimbabweans used the memes to mock the state media’s iron clad control of 
the news narrative. It was not just that the president fell but for the first time in 
a long-time citizens could comment without fear of retribution because social 
media provided them a veil of anonymity. The meme’s also humanized Robert 
Mugabe. Since independence Robert Mugabe has been viewed as this towering 
figure that cannot be challenged and cannot be mocked. 
Zimbabwe’s television and radio spaces are tightly controlled by the ruling 
party. The local radio channels and the one TV channel is run by the Zimbabwe 
Broadcasting Cooperation (ZBC) which, like the state-run newspaper The Herald 
only broadcast preapproved information. According to a report by the independ-
ent Think Tank Kubatana, during the 2008 election ZBC devoted 210 hours to 
coverage on ZANU PF against the 16 hours they devoted to the other political 
parties (MMPZ, 2008). This obvious partisanship behavior by ZBC is unconstitu-
tional. In 2000, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe declared the monopoly of the 
state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation unconstitutional, and yet the 
government has still not awarded an operating license to any prospective pri-
vate broadcaster. Using the internet and social media platforms like Facebook, 
YouTube and Instagram independent broadcasters have been able to provide po-
litical commentary on important topics which the state media refuses to report 
on. Comedy shows that emulate American late-night political comedies have 
mushroomed in the last few years. 
One popular comedian is Comrade Fatso, a young white Zimbabwean who 
runs Magamba TV, one of the most popular apolitical satire online channels. It was 
co-founded in 2008 by Farai Monro “Comrade Fatso” and Tawanda “Outspoken” 
Makawa, an extension to their now banned music group. Magamba TV is de-
scribed as “Zimbabwe’s leading producer of cutting edge, political satire and 
comedy shows” on their Facebook and YouTube pages which have 30,905 and 
over 3,000 subscriber’s reviewers respectively. Since independence the popula-
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tion of white Zimbabweans in broadcasting has declined. In fact, Farai is one 
of very few white Zimbabweans openly commenting on politics. Social me-
dia provides access to marginalized groups who cannot openly participate in 
Zimbabwean politics. Their most popular segment, from December 2016, which 
they mocked the government’s proposal to introduce a parallel currency to the 
American dollar, has been viewed over 50,000 times on Facebook and YouTube 
and shared nearly as many times on WhatsApp. 
BusStopTV is a two-woman popular comedy channel that addresses popular 
social and political issues. Their style is influenced by the very popular Ugandan 
comedian Anne Kansiime, who also addresses political issues like corruption us-
ing satire. BusStopTV has 15,000 subscriptions on YouTube and over 80,000 likes 
on Facebook. Their following has grown steadily. Their most popular segments 
are ones that mocked local celebrities, including religious leaders. However, 
in the last year, segments that mock politicians have also grown in popularity. 
Following Grace Mugabe’s diplomatic scandal in South Africa wherein the First 
Lady allegedly beat up a young woman who was in the company of her chil-
dren using an extension code and the Vice President Mnangagwa’s ice-cream 
poisoning, they released their most popular segment to date, Women’s Month, 
which was viewed 90,000 times within four days of being posted on Facebook. 
However, political satire is not without cost. The first challenge for the young 
activists is the exorbitant cost of producing film. 
Zimbabwe’s ruling party perceives the media, especially independent media, 
as a political rival, not as an independent arm of democratic governance. The 
executive branch of the government tightly controls the state media. Zimbabwe’s 
2013 Constitution protects the right to “freedom of expression which includes 
the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and or communicate ideas with-
out interference” (Section 60, 1-4), but ZANU PF constantly reminds citizens that 
while there is freedom before speech, freedom after speech is not guaranteed. In 
Zimbabwe, insulting the office or person of the president and his subordinates 
is a criminal offense. Journalists are often physically and verbally abused and in 
some extreme cases, those who publish information considered treasonous are 
forced into exile, tortured or killed. During the 2016 protests, the government 
arrested at least 31 journalists (Human Rights Watch, 2017). 
Former President Robert Mugabe and the First Lady would often publicly 
chide journalists, including those from state media, if they feel that the media has 
slighted them. At a ZANU PF rally in July 2017, the First Lady Dr. Grace Mugabe, 
publicly chided the president’s spokesperson George Charamba for going off 
script and specifically for not using his platform to write positive reports on her 
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philanthropic work. She also expressed anger over George Charamba, for using 
the state-controlled Herald newspaper as a platform for attacking some ZANU 
PF activists like ministers Moyo and Kasukuwere among others (ZemTV News, 
2017). In earlier speeches at rallies in 2017, the President and First Lady also pub-
licly called on ZANU PF youth to “take the war” to social media and deal with 
those trying to sellout the country using social media. 
Social media politics: four examples
Baba Jukwa the whistleblower 
In the period leading up to the 2013 elections, Zimbabwean politics was shak-
en by the rise of an online whistleblower by the pseudo name Baba Jukwa. Baba 
Jukwa described himself on his Facebook page as a “concerned father, fighting 
nepotism and directly linking community and their leaders” (Muzamindo, 2015). 
Baba Jukwa’s profile picture was that of an old non-threatening wise grandfather 
holding a cane. Baba Jukwa was assumed to be a disgruntled ZANU PF insider, 
possibly a member of the intelligence community. However, in 2014, Edmond 
Kudzayi, editor-in-chief of the state-controlled Sunday Mail, together with his 
brother Phillip Kudzayi and two others were arrested and accused of adminis-
tering the Baba Jukwa Facebook page. Daily for a period of about eight months 
Baba Jukwa would leak information on classified government events, he would 
predict government responses to his leaks and in some cases, he would leak pho-
tos and other personal information of those involved in a tabloid-like manner. 
Baba Jukwa was coined the Julian Assange of Zimbabwe. Baba Jukwa pre-
dicted a number of high-profile events that turned out to be true. In fact, on June 
13th, 2015 Baba Jukwa predicted the arrest of the Kudzayi brothers and two oth-
ers accused of administering the page. This was unprecedented in Zimbabwean 
politics where the state has always closely guarded information. Information is 
parceled out in bits and pieces such that citizens are never fully knowledgeable 
about the state of national affairs. Until the rise of online news outlets, the major 
news sources were heavily controlled by the state. Independent media publish-
ing houses have been victims of state violence. The leading national newspaper, 
Herald, functions like a mouth-piece for the ruling party ZANU PF. More often 
than not, Herald coverage is only free and fair to the extent that the paper is push-
ing an agenda supported by one of ZANU PF’s factions. Television broadcast is 
also heavily controlled by the state. 
Whereas ZANU PF rallies are broadcast live on television, opposition rallies 
do not get any coverage. Baba Jukwa was welcomed by citizens hungering for an 
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inside look into the government. Baba Jukwa also exposed the state’s weaknesses 
in their ability to control information in the digital age. The Zimbabwean govern-
ment is repressive and has powerful tools to silence dissenters, it was expected 
that they would soon discover Baba Jukwa and silence him. However, during his 
very brief existence Baba Jukwa exposed the weakness in ZANU PF’s control over 
information. Baba Jukwa’s page has been viewed more than a few million times. 
In June 2013, a month before the 2013 election, I recorded that it had just over 
300,000 followers. By the time Baba Jukwa was apprehended the page’s follow-
ing had increased to over 480,000. In contrast, social media following for pages 
dedicated to President Robert Mugabe and MDC President Morgan Tsvangirai 
had about 100,000 followers each in 2013 (Regan-Sachs, 2013).  
Baba Jukwa’s following was very diverse, it cut across different societal cleav-
ages: ethnicity, race, tribe, and class. Access to Baba Jukwa was cheaper than 
buying a newspaper3, in 2013 one could buy Facebook internet bundles for $1/
month. In 2013, a few months before the July election I conducted focus groups 
in Harare with potential voters. When I asked, “Where do you get your news?,” 
the majority, over fifty percent of those who responded said they checked Baba 
Jukwa’s Facebook page first thing in the morning. In the absence of a robust inde-
pendent media, Baba Jukwa was the anecdote to ZANU PF’s Herald propaganda. 
A month before the election Baba Jukwa revealed that the life of a young member 
of Parliament, Edward Chindori Chininga, was at risk and that the government 
thought to replace him with a less threatening figure. Chininga, who had re-
leased a damning report on corruption, was found dead nine days after Baba 
Jukwa released this scoop (NewsDay, 2013). In Zimbabwe, political opponents of 
the regime are often disappearing or die under mysterious circumstances. 
Baba Jukwa was also appealing to readers because most of what he reported 
was gossip and scandalous. As much as Baba Jukwa revealed important stories 
he also fed voters sensational stories about the personal lives of those in gov-
ernment. In a country where information is heavily policed even the most mun-
dane gossip becomes worthy news and citizens held on to that. The most popular 
“news” sources online are those that publish (stats) tabloid news. Baba Jukwa 
did not revolutionize Zimbabwean politics in the sense that the news that he 
provided increased voter turnout. Instead he fed citizen interest in the political 
process. Baba Jukwa’s more direct efforts to get citizens to register to vote do not 
appear to have had much impact on voters. Using his mantra “Asijiki” we will 
not be tired, he also used his message to get people to turn out and vote but this 
3  Newspapers cost USD$1. The average domestic worker earns USD$100. His following grew to just 400,000 by 
the time of their arrest in July 2014. 
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message drew little interest from voters who were more drawn to the scandals. 
After the 2013 election, most voters expressed anger towards Baba Jukwa blam-
ing him for ZANU PF’s win. Citizens took to Facebook and Twitter to express their 
anger; many argued that Baba Jukwa had been used by ZANU PF to divert voters 
from the real issues. While it is doubtful that Baba Jukwa was intended to benefit 
ZANU PF at the election, one of the lessons that can be drawn from this is that 
online engagement has broad implications including unintended consequences. 
That said, there is no doubt that Baba Jukwa liberated the control of information 
and demystified political leaders. Baba Jukwa exposed citizens to the political 
power of social media. While Baba Jukwa’s popularity has died down, the Baba 
Jukwa 2018 election page only has 17,000 followers and most of his posts receive 
less than 15 comments on any day, the political activity of Zimbabweans on so-
cial media has gone up.
Gukurahundi as a current topic
Gukurahundi (wash away the dirt) refers to the 1983 mass killing of citizens 
in Matabeleland at the instruction of the newly elected Prime Minister, Robert 
Mugabe, and his fifth brigade army. In an interview with Dali Tambo in 2012 
President Mugabe referred to the incident as a “moment of madness” (Tambo, 
2013). Until recently, the majority of Zimbabweans did not publicly discuss 
Gukurahundi because history and school text books have been carefully curated 
to exclude any mention of Gukurahundi along with other events that do not fit 
the government’s preferred historical narrative. In 2012, artists created a visual 
portrayal of Gukurahundi that went viral and created an opening for citizen di-
alogue on the issue. The government retaliated against the artists whose work 
was featured in the exhibit (Dugger, 2011). The government was forced to push 
back on allegations that Vice President Mr. Mnangagwa played an active role in 
the massacres. 
Since announcing her run for President, following her expulsion from ZANU 
PF and the office of the Vice Presidency, Joice Mujuru has had trouble answering 
questions on her involvement in Gukurahundi on the campaign trail (Muzulu, 
2017). Ten years ago, most people would not have expected that Gukurahundi 
would become an important campaign issue. It is unlikely that the Gukurahundi 
cloud will be damaging to any of the ruling party contenders in the immediate 
future, but it cleared that Zimbabwean citizens are increasingly concerned about 
the issue. In May 2017, when bones from a Gukurahundi dumping site were 
published by an online news website, the publication received a lot criticism and 
backlash from citizens forcing them to retract the story and delete the offending 
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pictures. Building on citizen interest in Gukurahundi, Vice President Mphoko in 
May 2017 proposed that the government implement a peace and reconciliation 
program to directly address victims of Gukurahundi and other atrocities. Mr. 
Mphoko said that there was need for the nation to collectively address the issue 
to allow victims to move on with their lives. 
Operation Murambatsvina 
One of the most recent heinous crimes committed by the ZANU PF govern-
ment was the clean-up exercise conducted in 2005 that left at least 700,000 ur-
ban families homeless. The majority of poor vendors affected by operation 
Murambatsvina lost their sources of livelihood. Interviews with those impacted 
in Harare and Victoria Falls also showed serious adverse health impact for HIV 
patients impacted by operation Murambatsvina. Operation Murambatsvina was 
the ZANU PF’s government first attempt at destroying the homes of citizens hid-
ing behind the need to clean up the city. They did the same in Epworth and other 
peri-urban areas in 1995 and 1996. As in 2005, earlier efforts were also conducted 
around election time and each time voters were strategically relocated to bolster 
support for ZANU PF. 
In early 2016, the city of Harare began a new wave of demolitions in the 
city. Onlookers took videos of the demolitions and circulated them online via 
WhatsApp, Twitter and Facebook. One video that garnered the most viewership 
was the demolition of a fully furnished double story home. The public called out 
the city officials who gave contractors passing grades at each level of building 
only to rescind their approval years after the buildings had been completed and 
occupied. The city council was not responsive until the First Lady brought up 
the videos, which she said she had also received via WhatsApp. Grace Mugabe 
chided the opposition run city council and demanded that they offer reparations 
to those affected by the newest wave of demolitions. 
However, social media attention does not always result in the positive reso-
lution of social justice issues. In June 2017, picture of families of mostly women 
and children including a newly born baby who were evicted from land claimed 
by the First Lady made rounds on social media, but the First Lady chose to ignore 
public demands for redress. It is unlikely that social media pressure from citizens 
will force the First Lady to address the situation, but citizen awareness on the 
issue is an important first step. In the past, atrocities by those in power have not 
been known to citizens. Some citizens have responded to the situation in Mazowe 
farms by calling for a boycott of dairy products from the First Family’s farm. 
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The rise of #thisflag, #tjamuka, Zimbabwe’s 2016 shutdown and impact 
In Zimbabwe, hashtag campaigns have been citizen driven, sometimes politi-
cal parties have joined in to support a cause but by and large the campaigns have 
been the brainchild of a small group of citizens. In 2016, a little-known Harare 
Pastor began his 25 day #thisflag campaign to highlight the social and economic 
problems in Zimbabwe. In the first video shot in a dimly lit office with a small 
Zimbabwean flag on his desk he expressed concern and frustration that the lib-
eration struggle promises embodied in the colors of the national flag have been 
realized for the younger generations. He made a pledge to post every day un-
til May 25. Pastor Evan Mawarire’s popularity grew steadily. On social media 
groups comments and views on his posts grew from less than ten during the first 
week to a few thousands on Facebook and to real engagement on WhatsApp. His 
message #thisflag was different because it was not immediately political, he was 
a pastor unaffiliated with any political party and most people interviewed at the 
time said they liked listening to him because he was a father. Evan Mawarire was 
petitioning the government to change things and not calling for an ouster of the 
government. 
In May, interviews on the ground revealed that Mawarire’s message was not 
nearly as widespread as social media likes and comments suggested, but for the 
first time in many years someone had unified Zimbabwean political rhetoric. 
Mawarire’s signature symbol, the Zimbabwean flag draped around the shoul-
ders, became a symbol for a generation disgruntled. In June, the economic cri-
sis was deepening, civil servants had not been paid for months and the general 
mood around the country was tense. Earlier that year another citizen group #ta-
jamuka had also gained popularity among “ghetto” urban youth. Tajamuka is a 
Shona word meaning we are upset. Unlike #thisflag which was very middle class 
in its design, the use of cell phone videos and English to address the public #ta-
jamuka was very active on the ground and unafraid to use physical means to ex-
press their message. The #thisflag and #tajamuka messages were used by citizens 
to call for #shutdowns. The last public strike was in the mid-1990s even the MDC 
had not been able to convince Zimbabweans to shut down the country. Messages 
asking people to stay at home were circulated via social media on Facebook and 
WhatsApp groups. On social media citizens were skeptical about the shutdown 
because there was no central space to get clarifications or instructions on what to 
do. The shutdown was solidified when the public transport drivers announced 
that they would not be operating on the day of the shutdown. There were also 
threats of violence against those who chose to leave their houses, but such mes-
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sages were not as widely circulated as the ones appealing to nationalism and the 
shared dream of a better Zimbabwe. 
On July 6, Zimbabwe was indeed shutdown, in both urban and rural areas 
there was no economic activity. The handful of businesses that did not heed the 
call to shutdown faced public lash. The following day only the state media re-
ported that the city had been “bustling with energy” and that it was “business as 
usual”. Two days after the shutdown I asked a diverse group of young students, 
representing the rich northern, middle income and poor southern neighborhoods 
to describe the shutdown from their activities and each student recounted that it 
was very quiet. Civil servants had been informed that missing work due to the 
shutdown was grounds for dismissal but even then, many of them were unable 
to make it work because there was no public transport. The stay away was suc-
cessful not just because of Pastor Evan Mawarire and his social media posts, but 
because of the joint efforts of multiple citizen groups as well and the efforts on 
the ground by public transport drivers and conductors. 
In the weeks that followed, citizens returned to work and it felt as though the 
#shutdown had not made a real impact on the government and the economy. 
However, in a speech marking her election to leader of the women’s league, First 
Lady Grace Mugabe addressed the shutdown, social media and their impact on 
the economy. The First Lady directly attacked Pastor Evan Mawarire and called 
him misguided, she then explained to the crowd that the stay away had cost the 
country millions of dollars and if this had gone on for a week the impact would 
have been irreversible. The First Lady went on to explain that her dairy farm had 
been affected by the losses they incurred from a single day of shutdown. 
A week after the first #shutdownzim citizen groups again called for another 
#shutdown. By all indicators the second shutdown was going to be a flop. The 
major weakness for hashtag citizens’ groups is their lack of a centralized unit; 
their goals are not always quantifiable, and, in some cases, citizens might not no-
tice the impact of the campaign. It came as a surprise when word spread via so-
cial media that Pastor Evan Mawarire had been arrested. As usual, the details of 
his arrest were classified, even though the Constitution demands that one should 
have their arrest details read to them on the day of the arrest. The following 
day social media was inundated with mixed messages about the Pastor Evan 
Mawarire’s court appearance. 
In Zimbabwe, government spaces are sacred and feared. When one drives 
past the State House/Presidential Residency they are expected to keep a wide 
distance and look away from the building. Making eye contact with the guards 
could be grounds for arrest or being shot at. The Court House never used to 
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be barricaded, this changed after the Mawarire case, but citizens where not ex-
pected to walk too close to the high court unless they had evidence of business 
on the premises. When #thisflag first announced on social media that instead of 
the shutdown they were now calling on people to show up at the courthouse in 
solidarity with Pastor Evan, their message was met with skepticism. I arrived at 
the courthouse 9 am, at that time there was just a handful of people. I attended 
a workshop in the CBD, which was most certainly bustling with energy in direct 
contrast to the previous weeks’ stay away environment. When we returned to the 
courthouse at 2 pm the crowd had increased significantly. Although there was 
no formal crowd count, unofficial estimates suggest that at least 2,000 citizens 
showed up at the courthouse. I conducted 30 official interviews with people who 
had travelled from different parts of Harare; two in particular had walked at least 
five kilometers in the wintertime to show their support. 
Government response 
African governments have not been very receptive to the rise of social me-
dia. Governments in countries where citizen protests grown out of social media 
movements have tightened their repressive laws or created new laws to curb 
social media access. In 2016, AccessNow, an organization dedicated to fighting 
internet shutdowns reported that African countries accounted for 11 out of the 
56 global shutdowns. This was an increase of over 50% from 2015 (Ngwa, 2017). 
The most severe shutdowns were experienced in Ethiopia and Cameroon. In 
both countries’ governments shut down the internet for extended periods of time 
after intense demonstrations that challenged the government’s hold on power. 
Cameroon’s shutdown lasted 93 days in English-speaking regions of the coun-
try. It followed weeks of protests from lawyers, teachers and other residents 
in those areas who have been agitating for better treatment from the French-
speaking government, which they say has long marginalized their communities. 
A Brookings Institute report estimated that the internet shutdowns in 2016 alone 
cost countries an estimated $2.4 billion. Beyond financial cost the shutdowns dis-
rupted business, travel and in extreme cases examination periods for students 
were delayed. In response to the citizen protests in July 2016, and internet cam-
paigns that followed, the government of Zimbabwe drew up internet restriction 
bills similar to those in China. Minister of Information, Communication and 
Technology, Supa Mandiwanzira, tried to calm public fears by explaining that 
the restrictions were to curb social media bullying. The Zimbabwean govern-
ment, like their counterparts in Cameroon, Ethiopia and across the continent, has 
argued that these restrictions are part of national security.
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While a very authoritarian executive runs Zimbabwe, the judicial and legisla-
tive branches of government have remained somewhat autonomous and strong. 
Therefore, the ruling party will circumvent the legal law-making process to push 
forward their agenda outside the traditional platforms. The government initially 
hiked the cost of data/internet bundles as a quick strategy to discourage people 
from sharing political information online. The cost of going online has always 
been a lot more expensive in Zimbabwe comparatively. In 2015, USD$1 would 
buy between 10 megabytes and 17 megabytes between the three providers, 
Econet (10MB), Netone (17MB), Telecel (9.5MB). The cheapest provider, NetOne, 
is government controlled and has poor service. The more affordable and private-
ly-owned telecommunications company, Telecel, was forced into a government 
by out in 2016 (The Financial Gazette, November 29, 2016). The more popular and 
very expensive Econet is owned by exiled Strive Masiyiwa, a successful tech mo-
gul. Masiyiwa has managed to do well in every other country except his native 
Zimbabwe because of the government laws that are targeted at keeping him out 
of business and also physically out of the country. In response to data hikes cit-
izens began the #datamustfall campaign which resulted in the slashing of data 
fees, but the overall price remains high for the average person earning less than 
USD$100 per month. 
In Zimbabwe, the more successful social media campaigns have been those 
with a direct ask and ones that do not directly challenge the government’s au-
thority. Efforts to block the first amendment to the Constitution fell on deaf ears. 
ZANU PF parliamentarians voted with the president. One very active independ-
ent candidate who won his seat with support from the opposition, which had 
actively opposed the first amendment, voted with ZANU PF and used his Twitter 
celebrity status to mock those who disagreed with his vote. 
The emperor is not asleep 
Although active social media users tend to be opposed to the ruling party, 
ruling parties are also engaging with social media. In November 2016, officials 
approached this researcher from the ZANU PF youth league that was interested in 
learning more about social media and politics. The league also disclosed that the 
ruling party was actively recruiting young people with an interest and expertise 
in social media. ZANU PF’s web presence has grown and surpassed activities 
by all other parties, including the leading opposition, Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC). The main ZANU PF in Zimbabwe has more than five active 
Facebook pages dedicated to sharing party news and live streaming events. Their 
live stream events have grown in popularity because while ZANU PF is not pop-
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ular, citizens are still interested in what happens at the rallies and often ZANU PF 
is the only party providing live stream. ZANU PF-UK chapter has a strong Twitter 
presence, they use their presence to mock the opposition and explain ZANU PF 
policies. In contrast, the MDC has virtually no presence on Facebook and very 
weak activity on Twitter. 
Former President Robert Mugabe and First Lady Grace Mugabe regularly ad-
dressed the need for youth in their party to join social media and fight against 
“detractors of the revolution” using social media. One of the very few Twitter 
verified Zimbabwean users is Minister of Higher Education Jonathan Moyo, also 
regarded as the brain behind many of ZANU PF’s most restrictive policies. Moyo 
is one of the few politicians who constantly engage with citizens. Moyo has de-
veloped a strong love and hate relationship with users. Until recently he was the 
only official engaging directly with citizens. On Jonathan Moyo’s birthday citi-
zens agreed to have a political ceasefire and encouraged each other to only send 
him well wishes and refrain from political arguments. However, even Jonathan 
Moyo’s social media is not completely free from party control. He has refused to 
attend live debates or any events where questions are not delivered in advance 
and agreed upon. Since his inauguration, President Mnangagwa has also taken 
up an active role on social media where he offers regular updates of his trips and 
answers citizen questions.
Conclusion
The full impact of social media on African politics, in particular Zimbabwe, 
will continue to evolve. Among Zimbabweans, social media has increased citi-
zen discussion of politics beyond traditional networks. Facebook and WhatsApp 
groups allow citizens to expand their friend and network groups in pretty sig-
nificant ways. This engagement does not always result in physical participation 
in rallies or protests in part because the state continues to respond with brutality 
against protesting citizens thus creating a lot of fear. During the 2018 election, 
there was a lot of online discussion about the elections but the electoral turnout 
was not that much higher from previous elections. One possibility is that those 
already planning to vote are also engaging in online discussions about politics 
whereas those abstaining from voting are not engaging in online discussions. 
As it does, it is clear that the positives outweigh the negative. However, 
African citizens must be wary of internet dangers such as fake news which tend 
to spread faster than true news and can have real negative impact. In general 
citizens have become more engaged with their politics and taken ownership of 
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their democracy in ways that would not have been possible without access to 
social media. Future studies must be conducted on the impact of online engage-
ment on citizen turnout. Anecdotal evidence from elections in Zimbabwe and 
other African countries suggests that online engagement has not done much to 
increase voter participation but it is unclear why those engaged online are not 
turning up to vote. 
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